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Financing Government Programmmes in
Economic Downturn: Theoretical Issues and
Perspectives
Akpan H. Ekpo •
1.

Introduction

primary goal of fiscal policy, defined briefly as government spending,
transfers and tax decisions, is to equilibrate the public sector's financing
requirement with the private sector's demand for investment. It is the
centerpiece of public and economic policy with fiscal outcomes having farreaching implications for other policies. Too often, fiscal policies fall short of
their desired objectives reflecting, among other things, inappropriate
expenditure programming and financing, with c onsequential problems of
debt accumulation, debt overhang, and retarded growth. There is thus, a
mismatch between theoretical expec tations and practical performance in
fiscal management.

A

Fiscal imbalance has been the experience of most developing countries since
the 1970 and 1980 decades. Public spending overshot domestic revenues,
resulting in fiscal crises and calls by the international community for adoption
of stabilisation and adjustment programmes. While stabilisation function is
concerned with the attainment of full employment of labour and capital at
stable prices, balance of payments equilibrium and satisfactory rate of growth
in per capita income and adjustment programmes seek to reconcile
aggregate demand with aggregate supply of resources.
In an inflationary recession which currently grips the Nigerian economy,
inflation is definitely not c aused by excessive aggregate demand. Indeed,
aggregate demand is projected to be inadequate in the face of rising
unemployment rate. Public expenditures have to be properly managed as
doing otherwise could create distortions which retard, rather than promote
economic growth and development. Moreover, the mode of financing the
expenditures need to be properly artic ulated as particular modes generate
costs and risks which c ould make them sub-optimal, retarding economic
growth. Thus, selectivity of choice of modes of financing government
programmes is of the essence. However, it is important to assert that
• Professor Akpan H. Ekpo is the Director General, West African Institute for Financial and
Economic Management /WA/FEM/, Logos. The author acknowledged the research assistance of
Mr. Som Omoruyi, Debt Advisor to WA/FEM in writing this paper. The views expressed in this paper
ore those of the a uthor and do not in any way represent the official position of the Central Bonk
of Nigeria.
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economic downturn and/or recession are unavoidable in a capitalist market
economy. Recessions are inherent no matter how the economy is managed.
If any economy would have averted recessions it would be the USA economy.
The USA economy remains the best managed market capitalist economy in
the world yet, she experiences periodic booms and busts. However, no two
recessions are alike and managing an economy remains a daunting task
given the global complexities.
The purpose of this paper is to articulate the theoretical issues and
perspectives which underscore the need for caution in financing government
programmes whether in the recurrent outlay or capital programmes as
individual financing modes have built in costs and risks that could inhibit the
realisation of government objectives. It is also to present a vector of
"optimum" choices of financing functions for possible end-uses/programmes,
intuitively and qualitatively, without the implementation of an econometric
model.
Consequently, the paper is divided into four parts. Besides this Introduction,
the paper in Part II highlights some theoretical issues. Part Ill focuses on sources
of financing and perspectives for choice of financing modes for particular
government projects. Part IV highlights the dangers in the adoption of
"wrong" financing modes, inadequate executive capacity and Part V
concludes the paper. It is expected that discussion in this paper would shed
more light on the subject matter and provide policy makers a menu of options
required for financing government programmes in a recession.
II.
Theoretical Issues
It may be interesting to begin the analysis of the theoretical issues by
articulating, albeit algebraically, the sources of financing fiscal deficit, defined
as the excess of total recurrent and capital expenditures over total revenue.
This will be followed, by analysis of the perspectives government needs to take
in mobilising funds for its programmes. Fiscal deficits may be financed
internally and externally.

Internal sources of financing the fiscal deficit include:
• Borrowing from the central bank through the issue of debt instruments.
• Altering the supply of money in the economy through engaging in
open market operations {OMO) involving buying and selling of treasury
securities. This is often targeted at implementing monetary policy, and
• Offering short- to long-term debt instruments (bonds). This also helps
deepen the financial sector. There are many financial institutions, such
as savings or mortgage banks, insurance companies, pension funds
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and specialised lending agencies with vast amounts of funds that can
be placed temporarily or indefinitely in government securities. In
general, deficits must be financed either by borrowing or by a
drawdown of cash balances.
Externally, many countries have obtained credits on concessional terms from
government and multilateral development institutions for many years, and
have set up units in their central banks and ministries of finance or semiautonomous offices to manage such debts. Countries have also contracted
export credits (with little concessionalities) and developed policies and
strategies to negotiate and administer these debts. In recent years, many
countries have borrowed extensively on commercial terms (with zero
concessionality) from international banks and capital markets (see Appendix).
Algebraically, a budget deficit or surplus involves stock/flow changes in public
debt and stock of high powered money. That is,
CDt
=6D1+6M1
(1)
6Dt
= Dt - Dt-1
(2)
Where:
D1
= stock of public debt at the end of period t
D1-1
= stock of public debt at the end of period t-1
CD,
= conventional/overall budget deficit
6M1
= variation in the stock of high-powered money during time t
Since the stock of public debt at the end of period t can be expressed as:
Dt

= Dt-t + 6Dt

(3)

Dt

= Dt-1+ CD1- 6Mt

(4)

It follows that:

Decomposing the overall budget deficit into primary surplus and interest
payment expenditure.
Dt

:: Dt-1- SP1 + itD1-1- 6M1

(5)

D,

= ( 1+ i1)D1-1- SP, - 6Mt

(6)

it
SP,

= (average) nominal interest rate
= primary balance (surplus excl. interest payments)

It follows that:

Where
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Or

Dt

= (1 + it) Dt-l - Bt - 6M

B
B>0
B<0
M

= primary balance;
= primary surplus;
= primary deficit
= monetary base or reserve money or high-powered

6

= change operator

(7)

Where

money

Re-arranging equation (7) gives
Dt
= Dt-1 - (Bt - itDt-t} - BMt

i

(8)

i

Overall balance Seignorage
Equation (7) always holds ex-post. It states that the government meets its debt
obligations, and that any gap, Bt < 0, must either be financed by new debt or
monetised, or a mix of the two. In contrast, Bt > 0, can be used to reduce the
stock of existing debt.
Normalise equation (7) by dividing it by nominal GDP, P, Y,

Dt

=

(1 + t)D t-l

Pt Y,

= (1

Y,

Pt

+ it)
I1OJ
I1 + g1) I1 + 17,l

Mil

Bt
Pt Yt

[ D,,
Pt-I

y,_,

J

Pt Y,

(9)

Bt

LlMt

P, Yt

Pt Yt

Where
g,

= real growth area
17,
= inflation rate (measured as the rate of change of GDP
deflater, p. Usinglower case symbols to denote ratios to GDP and LlMt
for seignorage, to rewrite (Eq. 10) and obtain the Law of motion of the
government debt to GDP ratio, we have:

d,=
=

(1 + it) dt-1 -(bt + Llmt)

I1 l )

(1 + g1) (1 + 17,)

.!...!.Ll dt-l
[ 1 +gr J

- (bt + 6Mt)

( 12)
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Where:
dt = a dt-1 - (bt + AMt}Y
r, = real interest rate
a, = is a discount factor defined as at = (l+n)/(1 + gt}

(13)

Equation ( 13) is the fundamental fiscal sustainability identity based on the
static budget constraint condition. From the above relationships, it is clear that
a change in government expenditure must be financed by a change in
government debt, change in primary surplus or the monetary base. Budget
deficit, however, cannot be financed by tax changes; hence recourse must
be made to money creation and debt creation. Money is created when the
central bank purchases either existing privately owned or newly issued public
debt.
When fiscal deficit is financed by money creation, the money supply expands
either directly if the borrowing is from the central bank or indirectly, if it is
through the deposit money banks. This process is easily dramatised in terms of
the Polak Model:

AM

=

ANFA + ACg + ACp + AOA(net) - AQM

( 14)

Where
AM

=

ANFA
ACg
ACp
AOA(net)

=
=

=
=

AQM

=

A

=

Change in money supply
Change in net foreign assets
Change in credit to government
Change in credit to the private sector
Change in other assets less other liabilities of the
banking system
Change in quasi money (time and savings deposits)
Change operator

Pundits reckon that on the average, about half of budget deficits in
developing countries are financed in this way (Little et al., 1993). There are a
variety of theories and/or perspectives relating to what may be deemed a s
the "optimal" mode of financing g overnment programmes. Put differently, are
there theories on how public funds can and should best be raised to promote
economic growth, especially in a rec ession ?
Choice Between Domestic and External Borrowing

On the domestic front, government may issue bonds for the purpose of
financing general or specific budget expenditures. This is significantly more
cost-effective compared with bank loans as it involves a one-off issuance c ost
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without any ongoing management fee. The use of bond augurs well for better
budgetary control, enabling government flexibility to spread its repayment
obligations over a longer (medium to long-term) period at relatively lower
costs than bank finance. Even so, the full advantage of this financing mode
cannot be taken if the bond market is not developed. In this regard, there are
two major pre-requisites namely, the existence of macro-economic stability
and a liberalised and stable financial system.
External financing, on the other hand, has been the major source of financing
especially, for developing countries as domestic debt markets started
featuring significantly only within the last decade. External financing has come
in the form of aid (defined as concessional loans plus grants). There has been
project and programme aid which includes general budget support, which
leaves the recipient government completely free over its use and also,
sectoral aid where the donor specifies the sector (such as education or
transport), but leaves the recipient to decide on the use of the aid within that
category. There is also bilateral and multilateral aid. While the bilateral relates
to aid from one country's government to another's, multilateral aid is largely
financed by Development Assistance Committee (DAC) members. However,
the downside is that aid can be source-tied and source un-tied. Again, the
commercial objectives of the donors are not always explicit and they seem to
play a larger part in the motivation of some countries' aid than in that of
others (Ekpo and Afangideh, 2012).
However, the relatively minimal interest rate cost has been a major attraction.
Aid has a grant element of 86.0 per cent as the norm but any loan with a
grant element of 25.0 per cent and above is deemed concessional. The
current grant element adopted by most developing economies, including
Nigeria and Ghana is 35.0 per cent.
Concesslonallty Issue
A concessional loan is one with a grant element 1 of at least 25.0 per cent.
However, it is argued that government need not shy away completely from a
non-concessional loan provided that the end-use of the loan is deemed to be
very profitable such as investment in the oil/energy sector. Such investments
have the potentiality of high return. Thus, borrowing from the hard windows to
finance such investment is advisable.

1

Grant Element (GE) measures the Concessionality of an official loan:
GE = fac e value of loan (stock} - sum of present discounted value of loan service
(flow)divided by the face value of loan X 100 (%)
= ((face value - i:Pv (loan service)/face value of loan) X 100
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Inflation - Inducing Factor
Some financing modes are more inflationary than others. For example,
borrowing through bond issuance is less inflationary than borrowing from the
deposit money banks, or even central bank. Borrowing from the deposit
money banks is less inflationary than borrowing from the central bank
because central bank financing in high powered money, a direct injection of
funds in the economy.
Cost and Risk Considerations
Some financing modes are riskier and costlier than others. For example,
financing projects through foreign direct investment (FOi) is good but fraught
with capital flow reversal risk. Dividends payment on such FOi projects may be
cumulatively significant enough to put pressure on the exchange rate,
depleting the external reserves. Real exchange rate appreciation is a major
risk associated with huge capital inflow through FOi or international
remittances, especially where the central bank does not have instrument
autonomy to sterilise the inflow2. Government loan portfolio should be
composed of loans with minimum cost-risk combination.
Counterpart Funding
Too often, donors require recipient governments to provide a proportion of
loan commitment as condition precedent to draw down on such loans. The
risk attached to this financing mode is that recipient government might not
have provided for it in its budget during budget preparation. Such fund could
be highly concessional but remain unavailable due to the non-provision of
counterpart funds.
Timing of Issuance of International or Offshore Bonds
For this mode of financing to be significantly realisable, some pre-conditions
need to be fulfilled. Government must be c ertain of international market
conditions for the effort to go beyond mere bench-marking anchor for other
domestic securities. International bonds issued when the international
community is facing c risis from macro-economic shocks, domestic or external,
may not yield desirable outcomes.
Choice from among Generic Loans Offers
For official loans, the grant element is a decisive factor. But in the case of
private or commercial loans, a lot of considerations need to be made in
deciding which loan to take. Critical factors have included real interest rate,
2

To sterilise here is mea nt toking ac tions to prevent the capitol inflow from increasing money
supply.
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the maturity of the loan, disbursement pattern, issues of raw material ties, and
other qualitative factors. For commercial loans with complex terms, there is
need to compute what is popularly called the "all in cost" and relate it to the
London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR), choosing the loan with the highest
basis point above the LIBOR (Omoruyi, 2016).
Government Programmes in Economic Downturn

In extant literature, there is a perspective that financing concrete
development projects exerts a greater positive impact on economic growth
than the financing of consumption goods involving capital spending on the
infrastructure needs of workers (capital projects in consumption programmes).
Government may, therefore, need to re-examine its capital expenditure
programmes with a view to giving adequate priority to concrete
development projects in recession. This will surely boost the recovery potentials
of the doses of funds for financing.
If economic downturn is strictly defined as when an economy is in a declining
phase then, expenditure on capital projects would impact on economic
growth resulting in recovery, all things being equal. However, if the economy
is in recession, then spending on both recurrent and capital becomes useful.
For example, the present recession in Nigeria is due both to inadequate
demand and supply (structural) challenges. Hence, putting money in the
hands of households and their families would boost aggregate demand. In
addition, spending on capital projects would enhance private investment.
Rnancing government programmes through debt would theoretically crowd
out private investment. Depending on the financing mix, the crowding out
could be partial or complete. Nonetheless, the outcome of the crowding-out
hypothesis remains an empirical issue particularly, if government programmes
are decomposed into sectors.
Ill.
111.1

Financing by End-Use - A Ratlonallsatlon
Methodology

The above sources of financing indicated early in the preceding section
involve costs and risks, making the choice of the "optimum" sources of
financing for specific end-use problematic. This section is targeted at
considerations governing the choice of optimum financing sources for
particular end-uses. Although analysis such as this would require the
construction of a quantitative probit model, the paper elects to be qualitative
at this point, relying largely on pragmatism and assumed notions of costs and
risks associated with financing end-use vis-a-vis a vector of financing
modes/ options.
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There are challenges/constraints involved in the choice of one fina ncing
option rather than another in the lead up to mobilisation of a pool of
financing sources, at least. theoretically deemed optimal or feasible vis-a-vis
the end-use. Discussions would revolve round eight end-use financing choice
functions formulated from the perspectives of developing countries such as
Nigeria and under some simplifying assumptions, which include:
a . no time constraint in the mobilisation of the optimal sources;
b. no undue political interference; and
c. existence of resource gaps: investment gap (1-S) and
government deficit gap (G - T) to be financed by the current
account gap, M-X.
111.2

Sources of Financing

Debt and non-debt sources constitute the source of financing in resourcedeficit low income countries.
Debt Sources

•

Concessional loans and grants
0

0

•

Non-concessional sources
0

0

0
0

111.3

Multilateral
sources/creditors
Bilateral donors

Export credits
• Suppliers' credit
• Buyers credit
• Official export credit
Multilateral bank loans and
(domestic
and
bonds
external)
Bank overdraft facilities
Capital
International
Markets (market finance)

Non-debt Sources

•

Foreign direct investment (FOi)
Equity
Privatisation receipts
Public-Private-Partnership (PPP)
Monetary base:

•
•
•

•
0

currency
outside
banks
(COB) + bank reserves

0

6Cg + 6Cp + 60A (net) +
6NFA or NDA + NFA
Where:
NFA = Net foreign assets
NDA = Net domestic assets
Other variables are
defined previously.

as

Possible End-use and Financing Options
In articulating the optimum combination of financing issues for end-use, the
paper first outlines the end-uses vis-a-vis their possible financing options, in the
form of end-use financing choice functions:
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Optimum Choice of Financing (OCF)
OCF
= f(end-use, constraint, country circumstances)
End-use
= f(constraints, country circumstances)
Possible End-uses
Economic project
Financing= f(FOI, loans, bonds, PPP, privatisation receipts)
Infrastructure/social safety nets= f(PPP, concessional loans,
bonds, FOi, Privatisation receipts, grants)
Bridging finance = f(overdrafts/loans/short-term)
BoP support = f(IMF facilities, SOR)

(15)
( 16)

(17)
(18)
( 19)
(20)

Equations (17) - (20) relate end-uses to possible financing modes. Which is the
possible combination of financing modes for an end-use having regard to
costs, risks, legal and exigency of end-use? As indicated in equation (15), the
optimum financing source for an end-use is governed largely by constraint of
financing mode and country circumstances. The underlay of these
determinants of choice of financing tor an end-use is broken down into costs,
risks, legal and exigency of end-use.
In reviewing particular end-uses vis-a-vis its possible financing sources, the
paper argues as follows:
Financing of Economic Projects
Equation (17) relates an end-use economic project to possible sources of its
financing, namely FOi, loans, bonds, PPP, privatisation receipts, etc. These
financing sources have their characteristics. FOi is non-debt creating but it
requires the need to repatriate dividends in the future. In the process of
repatriation, pressure could be placed on available resources of the country
as well as on the exchange rate. These are costs to the economy although,
inflow of FOi could momentarily appreciate the exchange rate, and could
create opportunities for financing investment project.

However, loans, even if non-concessional and costly, could be an optimal
choice for financing economic projects of strong viability where concessional
loans with string attached are hardly suitable. Bonds, especially those issued
for the international capital market, could adequately serve to finance
economic projects and even do so better than non-concessional loans which
may have relatively shorter maturity. PPP is good but its availability hinges on
private sector perception of the credibility of government including the
latter's governance rating. Even so, PPP approach could engender the
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creation of contingent liabilities with great potential to balloon the d ebt stock.
This is a hidden cost which must be recognised in this financing mode. It may
be argued that for economic projects, the optimum sources of financing
include, bonds, loans, PPP, FOi and privatisation receipt, in that order.
Infrastructure/Social Safety nets

Equation (18) relates infrastructure/social safety nets to the following financing
modes: PPP, concessional loans, bonds, FOi, privatisation receipts and grants.
Considering that concessional loans are characterised by high grant element
and long maturity, it is the financing mode to occupy second best position
after grants for infrastructure projects. Although PPP is a good source for
financing infrastructure, the hidden cost manifesting in emergence of
contingent liabilities, places this financing mode in the third position after
grants and concessional loans, as optimum sources of financing
infrastructure/social safety nets. For PPP, government must have the c apacity
to negotiate and make it a win-win situation.
Bridging Finance

This is a form of short-term loan from banks available to government to
"bridge" the period until government obtains expected revenue inflow or a
medium or long-term loan to replace it. For example, an overdraft is a good
source. For individuals, bridging loan features also in the housing market to
enable them to finance the purc hase of new houses while arranging longterm mortgage finance.
BOP Support

The IMF provides support through its conc essional window in the form of the
Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) and also, through its nonconcessional facilities such as the Stand-By Arrangements (SBA), Extended
Fund Facility (EPF), Supplemental Reserve Fac ility (SRF), etc.
111.4

Constraints to Choice of Financing Options

In the lead up to an optimum envelope of financing options for spec ific enduses, the debt manager is faced with a variety of constraints. Some of the
constraints are general in nature regardless of the nature of end-use. These
include the legal framework, foreign policy/international economic-relations,
level of government and global economic conditions.
Legal Framework

Most developing countries have in place the basic element of a legal
framework for public debt management. However, changes in the legal
framework are often crucial to enabling countries to manage their debt
liabilities, especially market borrowing, actively and flexibly. The c hanges
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could include the extent to which the roles and responsibilities of officials are
specified in legislation which may also constrain their activities in those roles.
Primary legislation for debt management that includes debt ratios as a fiscal
stability tool can be problematic. If they are too low, they may constrain
responses at the time of financial stress, given the time lags involved in passing
new legislation. If too high, debt ratios may not be meaningful. Thus, it is
imperative to have a clear awareness of the legal framework and issues prior
to resource mobilisation.
In the particular case of sub-national borrowing, for instance, concerns may
be reflected in the debt legislation:
(i)
that the aggregate of sub-national borrowing does not
undermine the government macroeconomic policy stance.
(ii)
that borrowing is properly appraised; and does not constrain
central government's own borrowing. (Ekpo, 2012)
Foreign Polley/International Economic Relations
Foreign policy could also pose challenges to effective funds mobilisation. In
some cases, policy may preclude borrowing from specific country jurisdictions
for strategic reasons regardless of the merits of some financing source.
However, this type of constraint is few and far between.
Level of Government
Central government would impose borrowing restrictions on the sub-national
jurisdictions in order to maintain macroeconomic stability.
Global Economic Conditions
As exemplified by the global economic crisis of 2008/9. restrictions to
borrowing often affects recovery effort of governments in deep financing
needs.
Country Circumstances
Individual developing country circumstances vary and could pose financing
constraints. Such constraints may include: the current stage of development,
especially with respect to financial markets and economic policies, the level
and composition of the country' s debt portfolio which may constrain further
borrowing however attractive the loan terms, and the exchange rate regime
maintained. Other constraints are the degree of capital account
liberalisation, which could inhibit capital inflow, and the country's credit rating
which may inhibit its effective negotiation of loans, political instability,
availability of counterpart funding as condition precedent to loan
disbursement and above all perceptions about the governance processes.
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IV.
Effeds of "Wrong" Financing Modes
The effects of application of "wrong" financing modes for government
projects are legion. The most notable include: cost overruns; debt servicing
difficulties; project failure; debt overhang; and economic decline. The
theoretical prescriptions of debt overhang which stand in bold relief among
the effects are listed below:
• Debt overhang Induces a decline In Investment: Studies have shown
that the poor investment and growth performance of highly indebted
countries in the recent years is frequently attributed to the burden of
their foreign debt - a high ratio of external debt to GDP - a
phenomenon known as debt overhang. According to this hypothesis,
the accumulated debts act as a tax on future output, discouraging
productive investment by the private sector. This is because an
increase in the production or export of the indebted country
generates revenues that must be used to repay current debt
obligation. In other words, creditors receive a significant portion of
future returns on investment (Borensztein and Kumar, 1991 ; Omoruyi,
1995).

•

Unduly large debt size creates problems for effective debt
management: For effective debt management, the debt/GDP ratio is
often at a low level, not exceeding the critical levels set by the World
Bank. Recently, the World Bank has put in place different debt
sustainability thresholds reflecting the quality of countries' policies,
debtor countries' policies and institutions. This is because a high
debt/GDP ratio suggests that the debtor country is at a great risk. Thus,
for large values of the debt/GDP ratio, increased reliance on foreign
borrowings may lower the growth rate of GDP even if the marginal
product of capital exceeds the world interest rate. Moreover, an
excessive rise in debt/GDP ratio may inc rease the perceived
probability of future debt-servicing difficulties, thus raising expectations
about increased taxation, inflation, currency depreciation or capital
flight. However, it should be noted that revenues pay for debt and not
GDP.

•

Monetary and economic Instability: Granted that large amounts of
capital inflow notably foreign borrowing, grants and direct foreign
investment may lead to an accumulation of foreign exchange
reserves, the impact of this development on the financial system may
be seen through an analysis of the monetary survey as follows:
M
=
NDAb + NFAb
(i)
NDAb
=
Cg + Cp
(ii)
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(iii)
(iv)
(v)
(vi)

Substitute (vi) in (iii)
M = (G-T) + ANFAo + ACp + ANFAb

This accounting identity can be used to analyse the effects on the
money supply of borrowing abroad by the government to finance a
deficit, arising from debt overhang.
Where
M
=
money supply (M 1): narrow measure of the
money stock
credit to government
=
credit to private sector
=
=
net foreign assets of government (central bank)
net foreign assets of the private sector (banks)
=
change operator
=
Given the widened fiscal deficit arising from heavy debt service payment,
government has to finance it both from domestic credit to government (ACg)
and change in foreign assets (NfAQ). When the government borrows from the
external credit market, so that there is a decline in NfAg, and transfers the
proceeds of the borrowing to the banking system, then the net effect will be
an increase in net foreign assets of the private sector (banks) and an
equivalent increase in money supply (M) associated with the foreign financing
of the government deficit.
However, this theoretical prognosis may not fully hold. The actual size of
increase in money supply depends on movements in credit to government
and private sector response to funds availability. Thus, it depends on whether
the sectors absorb more credit or keeps more of the funds away in term
deposit accounts.
V.
Conclusion
This paper has reviewed the various sources of financing of government
programmes during economic downtown, articulating both internal and
external sources. It has also rationalised the financing modes for particular
programmes on the basis of some assumed notions of costs, risks and country
circumstances, perspectives and theories characterising such financing
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vehicles. This is aimed at ensuring that, as much as possible, the financing of
government programmes (end-uses) is governed by some "optimal"
considerations even without implementing the rigorous probit econometric
analysis often germane to such binary choice situations.
The end-uses have included financing of economic projects,
infrastructure/social safety nets, bridging finance and BOP support, in the lead
up to the determination of the optimal sources of financing. Each end-use or
programme is related in a financing function to a vector of financing modes,
taking into consideration inherent costs, risks, exigency situation, country
circumstances etc. and a vector of other limiting constraints. Thus, economic
project financing is related to loans (non-concessional), bonds, PPP, FDI and
privatisation receipts in that order. Infrastructure/social safety net financing is
related to grants, concessional loans, PPP, bonds, FDI, and privatisation
receipts. Overdrafts/loans - short-term financing from the banks, are the
optimal sources for bridging finance. Finally, it may be argued that BOP
support can be related to IMF facilities and SDR as its feasible sources of
financing.
Of importance, is the theoretical analysis, of the possible effects of application
of unsuitable financing modes, in terms of costs/risks considerations. The
analysis of the effects of debt overhang stands in bold relief.
It is important to state that there is no primrose path to the financing of
government programmes. It behooves officials engaged in mobilisation and
negotiation of financing modes to be thoroughly acquainted with the rules,
principles, practices or conventions and workings of the markets as well as the
peculiarities of individual financing modes. It is also essential to constitute
negotiation teams made up of experts versed in concessional loans, export
credits and market finance. The teams should include lawyers who will monitor
hidden clauses in loan agreement that may derail the effective execution of
the programmes or projects. Finally, experts must be familiar with the
techniques of choosing between financing sources as well as possess a deep.
thorough knowledge or understanding of the projects to be financed. It is a
truism that there are no primrose paths to financing of government
programmes; hence the panoply of theories and perspectives invoked by
debt managers involved in funds mobilisation. The need to recover from the
current recession and resume growth calls for discipline, dedication, skills and
pragmatism in the application of the identified theories and perspectives in
funds mobilisation for programme financing.
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APPENDIX
Sources of External Borrowing

l.

Official Development Finance (ODF)
• Official Development Assistance (ODA); and
• Other official Development Flows (ODF).
ODA

•
•
•
•
ODF
•

Grants/loans by governments to promote economic
development/ welfare cooperation;
Excludes military assistance and official exports credits;
25 per cent or more grant element qualifies a loan as ODA;
however, norm for ODA is 86 per cent and
Grants component of ODA has risen through the years.

ODF loans have title or no concessionality; it includes:
o Disbursement from regional development banks
o IBRD loans
o Bilateral components arising from debt restructuring
agreements;
o Interest on World Bank loans must cover interest cost + 50
basis point (or ½ per cent)

2. Export Credits (ECs)
•
Non-concessional loans to finance purchase of goods;
•
Disbursement occur when goods are received by the importer
o Types
When export credits are extended directly by an
exporter (suppliers credits)
When export credits extended by exporter's
commercial bank- (buyers credits).
When extended by specialised agencies of
exporter's government (official export credits).
Types of ECs may be grouped Into
• Private Export credits
o Suppliers' credits
o Buyers' Export Credits
• Official Export Credits
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Suppliers' Credits

•
•

Extended by private firms in developed countries to governments
in developing countries;
Credits in form of commodities or technical cooperation.

Buyers' Credits

•
•

More common than suppliers' credits as they are extended
through commercial banks; and
Maturities are short: 3 - ?years

Note

Most private export credits are insured by national export insurance agencies.
When insured, private export credits are negotiated through the Paris Club
Protocol.
Official Export Credits

•

•
•
•

Insured by specialised export c redit agencies (ECA); examples US
Export-Import Bank (EXIM), France (Coface); Italy (SACE), Germany
(Hermes), United Kingdom (ECGD) etc,
Paris Club debts are covered by these export credit agencies;
Interest rate is market related; and
Maturities are much longer than can be provided by private
lenders

Export Credits Agencies

•
•
•
•
•
•

•

Purpose promotion of domestic export industry in ECA country
Loans, guarantees and insurance to support sales to buyers in
developing countries
State - controlled (OPIC, Exim Banks, ECGD, Hermes, KfW, SACE,
Coface, etc.... )
Financers, guarantors and/or insurers
Trade distortions through mixed financings (aid and export credit)
Regulation via OECD Consensus/Arrangement
o ECA financing limited to 85 per cent of value of total
transaction
o Minimum interest rate chargeable to borrowers
o Maximum repayments terms
o Minimum grant element in tied aid
Concerns on competition between ECAs and resulting lack of
social and environmental safeguards of projects supported.

Ekpo: Financing Government Programmes in Economic Downturn

27

Export Credit Agencies - Methods of financing

•
•
•

Direct lending: ECA loan to buyer in developing country to finance
purchase from exporter in ECA country.
Intermediate lending: ECA loan to commercial bank which in turn
lends to buyer in a developing country.
Interest rate equalisation: ECA compensation to commercial
lender which loans funds to buyers at below - market interest rate.

Structure of transactions:

•
•

3.

Buyer's credit: loan to purchaser of goods as borrower
Supplier's credit: loan to exporter of goods as borrower, issuance of
promissory notes by buyers against remittance of goods; recourse
against buyer of notes not paid on maturity.

Private Flows

•

Consist of
• International bank loans
• Bonds
With the debt crisis of 1982, private lending shifted from commercial
bank lending to bond and equity portfolio flows. Bond issues of
developing countries were mainly in US dollars; but Latin American
borrowers began to issue bonds denominated in ECUs (now Euros) and
pesetas. Major borrowers issuing bonds were in Korea, Mexico, Brazil,
Hungry, and Argentina.
Sources and Costs of Concessional Flows

The main sources of concessional flows for most developing countries are
official that is, multilateral donors and creditors.
• Many multilateral institutions and bilateral governments have two
financing windows: a concessional window for aid finance and a
non-concessional window for export credits or market-related
loans.
• Aid flows are also provided by non-governmental organisations
(NGOs), charities and religious, scientific, educational and cultural
organisations.
Multilateral Donors/ Creditors

The main multilateral institutions providing grants and concessional loans
include:
•

The European Union, which provides both grants and concessional
loans to developing countries. The European Investment Bank (EIB} ,
a development bank, provides long-term loans to both public and
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private sectors. The European Development Fund (EDF) provides
resources, mainly, grants to cover planned macro-economic
support, programmes and projects. In addition, resources can be
used for debt relief or to help with unforeseen shocks.
•

The International Monetary Fund (IMF), provides concessional loons
to low income countries through its Poverty Reduction and Growth
Facility (PRGF). Non-concessional loons ore provided through the
Fund's five main facilities: Stand-by Arrangements (SBA), Extended
Fund Facility (EFF}, Supplemental Reserve Facility (SRF), Contingent
Credit Lines (CCL) and Compensatory Financing Facility (CFF).

•

The Islamic Development Bank, provides long-term finance for
development projects, mainly, agriculture and infrastructure in the
least developed countries.

•

The United Nations and Its main agencies, such as the United
Notions Development Programme (UNDP), United Notions
Conference for Trade and Development (UNCTAD), United Nations
Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the World Food Programme (WFP),
provide most of their assistance in the form of grants.

•

The World Bank, has three lending arms. The International
Development Agency (IDA) provides highly concessional loons
and some grants to low income countries, with per capita income
of less than US$885. The International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (IBRD) provides non-concessional loons to middle
income and creditworthy poorer countries. The International
Finance Corporation {IFC) provides loan and equity finance for
private sector projects in developing countries.

There are also regional development banks and institutions providing external
assistance to geographical regions. The main regional providers are:
•

The African Development Bank, provides external assistance
through its concessional window, the African Development Fund
(AFDF) and non-concessional lending, through the African
Development Bank (AFDB).

•

The Arab Bank for Economic Development In Africa (BADEA)
provides concessional loans for projects financing and technical
assistance grants.
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•

The Asian Development Bank (ADB) provides both concessional (its
OCR facility), non-concessional loans and exceptional assistance
via its Special Programme Loans (SPL).

•

The European Bank for Rec onstruction and Development (EBRO)
provides market-related loans to governments and private
enterprise in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the
Commonwealth of Independent States.

•

The Inter-American Development Bank provides both concessional
finance through its FSO window, and non-concessional loans
(Ordinary Capital) to member states.

In addition, there are Sub-regional Institutions providing external assistance
including the:
•
•
•
•
•

•
•

Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development (AFESD).
Caribbean Development Bank (COB) and CARICOM Multilateral
Clearing Facility (CMCF).
Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO), West African
Development Bank (WADB), ECOWAS Fund.
East African Development Bank (EADB)
Central America Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI), Ardean
Development Corporation (CAP) and Financial Fund for the
Development of the River Plate Basin (FONPLATA).
Nordic Development Bank (NOB) and Nordic Development Fund
(NDF).
Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).

BIiaterai Donors/ Creditors

Bilateral donors/creditors are sovereign governments or their agencies provide
external assistance. The donors/creditors include developed and developing
country-governments and agencies. The developed country-governments,
which are members of the OECD, are sometimes referred to as OECD
donors/creditors, with the others being called non-OECD donors/creditors.
Another classification of bilateral donors/creditors refers to those
governments, which are participating creditors at the Paris Club, referred to as
Paris Club Donors/Creditors, and those which are not, called non-Paris Club
Donors/Creditors. Most developed country-governments provide grants and
concessional loans.

